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ACTION PROGRAMME FOR TH EUROPEAN  AIRCRAFT CONSTRUCTIOI.I  II{DUSTRY
fbe Conmission has forwarded to the Council a communication  on the operati-onal
conditions obtaining in the Cornmunity aircraft  construction industry and on
the measures necessary for lts  devalopment 1 ).
Thls communication  fron the Commission is  coupled with an action programme
which takes into account both the mutual implications of the industrial,
civil  and military aspects gf the aeronautical sector, and the aspects
relating to air transport.  The Conmission believes tbat the Governments
of tbe Comnunity have a basilc decision to take.  If  they refuseC to grasp
the new opportunities in thd aeronautical seetor and continued to conduct
policies  on a natidnal basis, any independent European aircra'ft
construction industry would disappear. Taking these new opportunities will  nean
accepting that the gri3gjaft industry will  be incl,uded r*ithin the framework of
a conmon policy and giving the Community the mean6 necessary to put this into
effect in the industrial,  cqmmercial and transport sectors.
The action programme proposed by the Commission is  contained in this
InfornatiOn  relcase  with its  two anneXes, one outlining tbe current
state of the European aircraft  construction industry and the other setting
out guidelines for the establishment of a common civil  aviation programme.
I.  lqsicl\rgls:Lqqq- faging the luropean industry
Because of the considerabLe influx of neror technologies which it  involves'
the development of the aircraft  construction industry requires clear strategyt
systematic long-term p]-annirlg and consistent administration" Because of the
large-scaLe investnents that must be injected, it  also requires a broad
financial basis, secure financing and good market prospects; finalJ-y' it  is
necessary to avoid the forms of wastage caused by the duplication of effort
and the squandering of opportunities for rationalization.
The Governments in the Commrtnity therefore have a basic decision to take.
If  they refused to seize new opportunities and continued to conduct &ilparate
national policiesr &ny independent  European aircraft  construction industry
would disappear, with harmfUl consequences for the Communityrs econonic  and
political  future (see Annex 1 for an outline of the current state of the air-
craft  cons truction industrtrf). On the other hand, the opportunities will  be
considerabte if  the Governmdnts are prepared to pass beyond the stage of
inter-governmental cooperatlon involving various national aircraft  construction
polieies and if  they accept that the aircraft  construction industry should be
placed under the wing of the Community, giving it  the neans necessary for
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II"  The market
The market, partieularlf, the domestic market, is'the  first  real-ity to be
taken into consideration when examining the'problems'of deveLoping the
industry.  The Er4ropean aiqcraft construction industry can secure its
future only on tbe basis of its  own capacity to batisfy u$ersr needst
as shaped by the conditions of compettiion, bdth within ard outside the
Community" Furthermorer it  is  obvious that the aircraft  construction
industry cannot hope substantially to increase'its penet'rati.on on the
export market.s (rna tne"e ale essential to it)  where competition is  toughest
if  it  is  edged out of its  own market. 
i
the tlaet that,tho same i.ndustry supplies both the civil  and military markets
and that the rnilitary. market absorbs more t,inan 5Q/9. of airg,raft production
means that it: would be pointless to institute  an'y common policy which sought
to confine iteelf  to the civil  sector'and ignore the firili.tary market.
( a ) The E.ulopsgg*e1_vtl_aCthe:L
.The creati.on of a European aircraft  construction policy presupposeF th: 
- establishrnent'of a genuine European market. No decision has yet been talcen
''on an air transoort-nolicv rnhicl. under the t'erms of the Trerd.ty, reqtrires
the Council's,gnanimous approval, and air  services withi4 Furope therefore
result from arranggments  iaueO on international systemF. 
:
'  i  j  '.:1  .,  .  .:  .,
', [he cornmission considers that  the. aim shou].d be tq' pass beyond the present
system ot'strictly  demarcated national markets on which access to traffic
is  all.ocated basically. according fo  t\re.natio4ality  of thq. airlines.  ,. ,:
A''r'ecent ruling  bf  the court of Justice '(ota'se t67/74) laid  down that  the
general rules of the Treaty were appl-icable to air  transport-  The Cornmission
^is currently  exarnining the consequence.s'of  this  rul-ing viith the'assi:stance.of,r'
expertsTftRB Nlember States"  Ii  this  approach is  adopted, then-the Community nust at
the same time settle  on a common- policy  whbse .aim' would :be to create a 
'
communityrnarket'toreplabe'the"ii"tittgsy'stems:andwhichcouldonlybeput
into  effect  gradually in  view of'the  complexity, of the ,problens"
Tlris policy'wouId: have the following  general objectives  :
(a) th.e est'abllshment.pf a, Euqopean air  space administered. at  Conmunity.Level'
and, for  traffic  r*itnin  the'Community; a system of regulated iompetition
designed to  offer  the public  services best suited to their  needs and at
the mqst advantageous 'rates, by .{q{orming  and diversifying  service.s.and
rationalizing  the structure  o,{ the. networks:r especi4lly as regards inter-
regional transportl.
'; ''
(b) joint  negotiatlon of  agreeilents with non-member countries, particularly
as regards traffic  rights,  leading to a strengthening of the Communityts
powers of negotiation and optimum operation of international  routes and
services.
A,11 this  would have a considerable impact by creating an economic situat'lon
favsurable to the harmonization  of  the factgrs underLying the structure of
the networks (frequency,of services, llnes  arid aircraft  dimensions) whiclt
determine the choices made when equipment 1s purcha.sed.
"/.4ji - 3'-
A Conmunity polioy along theee llnes, allowing airlines to participate in the
Establishnent of European airaraf-t construction prugranmes*and thus to belome
the valicl negotiating partner which the 'industry needs, wori.ld. bring about tho
most favourable situation for aligning the airlinesf need.s as regard.s inter-
national conpetition and the provlsion of the most adrranced teohnolory 'by the
Ehropea,n airqraft oonstruction  indgqtryr
(b) $re ,E\ropeah pllitarl. ma_rkel,
Ithe cLupJ.ioation of dewlopnents at natlonaL lerrel and the cost of nultiple
Iogistio supports anil d.lfferent spar,e parts systems lead. to poor utillzation of
publ-ic aorolfi tr\rrtherroore, the d.ifferqences  ln E\rropean aeronautical eqtrirnent
and. othen milltaty equipment involving adrranoed.  technology (olectron:ic eqrlp;
nent) also have ha:mffrl operati.onal effects (for exa,nple, the w"id,e rnnge of
airoraft and equipment makes for inconpatibiltty wj.th service installations
and. raises oonsi.derable problens when the airforces use tlifferent NATO bases).
lhougb the Anerioan anns suppliers appear to have obtained. a short-tern benefit
from ilivided. European polici,es which enabled, therr to obtain contracts such as
tbose from four. E\rropean oountries for the purchase of the F 16r the ,Amenicanst
long-term interest, like that of the Suropeans, appears to l-ie in the establish-
nent of a coherent'E\ropean s1a1s*purchaelng stnroture which would. e.nable Europers
industrial capacity to contribute mole economioally to the Joint tj":fence effo:rt.
flhe'0overnmentg  of the Member States should, therefore decicl,e to sei irp d.
joint nllitary aviation procursnent  agency which would. be' rospohcible for
Joint d.evelopment  antl. the purchaseE of mllitary a,sri.atton equipnoerr:i in keeping
trlth the need,g of the European arrned fotroes. ft.could. be an &d. h'r,.,-, boSr working
'ln Uaieon wlth the appnopri.ate ninisters from the Member States arid cooperating
olosel,y wittr the Comrnission to allow tbig letter bodJr to, administer'aircraft
industry policy in f,ull posessioa of, all  the neoegsary info:roationr The Agency
would rbboome an organ of .the E\ropean Union as soon as this hn,g be€.n estabiished..
.l
lhe Agencyts duties would. be as foLlows i
a) to ooorrlinate the requirements of Suropean air forces so that they 4rake'  .
i  systematto and stand.ard:izsd. use of, eristing E\rropean roilltarlr aircraft fo:r
comparable p.w?oses in the various air forces;
t)  to irlentif] firture Joint n€eds d.emanili.ng ne]r joint d.evelopmeltsr
A European policy for the purchasing of nil-ftary aviation equlpment shouLil be
aCcorrparrtred by d.i$cussibne w'ith the United. $tateg' to.'achieve the fo}lowi.ng 'objectives :
(i),resiprooal  renoval of narket barriers wlth .a view to a substantiaL and balancecl
'inolease in transatl.antio trade in both dl-irections; :  l





for the aircraft  construction  i.ndust
To ensure th€ future of'the Commtrnityf s aircraft  eons+.ruction indrrstry, j-t
is  surely necessary to pass beyon,l the stage of inter-gonernmentar cocperation
involvlng different aircraft  construction po3"lcies which hgve up to nour
remained stri0tly  national
The Comrnunity shoul-d therefore take the aircraft  construction i;ndust'ry under
its  wing
The Comnunity's-aircraft  construction policy would be,conCucterC in tls  s.rt-ttg
fashidn .i: psiicf  in other sectordi  in other woidel acting oni a Com;nisiisn
proposal and after consulting tire European'ParLiament,  the Council would take
the large-seale policy decisions oh tbe programnes, Community financlng and
the international agreements releting to this sector.  fhe Corurnisslon would
administer the joint  aircraft  constructlon policy on the basis of these
decisions arrd take the necessary steps to corrsult the user6r producterst
trade union and national authorities.  : 
,.
The comrnission would so administer'.the aircraft  oonstruction poLicy ab 'Lr
nake maxlmun use .of existing nationaL structures and deeentralize operat-r:us
as nuch as' po'esibte.
The Corhrnunity financiiig of the dfcraft sonstruction industry wouLd no!
supplenent national' financing but would 'gbadually replAce i:t.  : '
..,1  :
The ruleb of tinancial"adninlstr'atlon ehould be drawn up in' such a wby 'as
to guaranteeit'he multidnnual decisions taken byl'the council on budgetarx'commit
'rnents mdtcti the seofe of the Joint progranme, entl that 'the Commieeion,; as
the adminibtrative body, is  abl"e tb ceill,, oni the capital market and incur,the
expenditure  nec'ese'artrJ to carry out the progrb,&ne;'  ; : i'  '  :
1  :  :..  !  :..!
Thirt po1-icy would involve  :  : ..
bringing all  activities  relating 'to the construc'tion' of 1a:rge civil  aircrafi
withtr. the sc'ope of a consistant:progranrne  erlsuring the besb possible
utilization  of resources (see Annex 2);
intr.oducing a systen of cLose cooperation between the industryr ai'rli'nqs and
public authorities for the decisions r+hich the joint  progranne uiBl require; ''  :





cobperetion r';ith partnbrs' in
penetrating export riarkets;
non-menber eountriesr' both aE regar4q' industrial
these countries and',the commercial stratqgy for
;  harnonizing legiel.atite or administrative,,provisiOns  oD airwoilhisess,certi-
ficates and comp)iance vrith nuisande control standards,and..with pfoblems of
etandardization in  generaS-.
A, policy of this type shouLd aLso help to establish a permanent industrial
structure baeed on the experience hitherto gained durlng cooperation, at least-5;"
ac reger.ds largb civtl  aLrcraft and eepecially in narketing and;'aftef-sales
service; this i"il.tr alLow thg industry to inprove !ts' productivity and thus'
obtain a1r the benefits fron ratlonalf.zation on a European scaIe.
The first  decision which the Council ie called upon to take as a result
of, the ConnissLon proposaL relates to the approval in principLe of a European
programne backed by. Joint.financing and drawn up with the participation of
constructlon firns  and airlines in the Comnunity"
l':riaI.iy, it  should be noted that there is  a special relationship.in "the
airc.raft construction industry between the industrial undertakingstand the
governments. Although,a substantial part of this induetry in Europe. is'
publicly-ow[€d, lt  renaLns essential for the industry to retairi prinary
responsibility for decislons on comnercial operations to be undertake4, the
risks to be accepted and the managefient  of, the necessary r€6oltrc€8..
TiIE SITUATION IN T}TE AIRCRAFT CONSTAUCTION  SACTOR
1, .1Lq*r,eF?o.q fpWf  e4t di{{I*^ulti gs
Current short-tern economic difficulties  have highligbted all,the  linitations
of the cooperation scbemes and alL the contradictions of the national
policies pursued.up to now. Because of tbe higtt development coste and tlre
need to share then out and to galn accqss to bigger riarketsr all  !4g  i'i
recent clvil  aircraft  developnents (Concorde, Airbue, fokkeriVFW 614, F 281
Mercure) have involved European.coLlaboration in one forn or,another?
The sh.ortcomings of intra-Conmunity cooperation have bowever been,revealed.
First. of el,L, biJ.ateral and trila!eral..cooperation p{ogranmes.haye.not  been
pagt of a single..and consistent franework. Seeondlyrcooperation bas been
largely confined to developnent and the.rnadufacture.of 6eriee'wltb;far less
ernphasis on narketing. TnL fragnentation of sales efforts has meant that
pLanntng hae concentrated on technologlcal rather than narket obJectives.
For reasons of comnercial competitlon  and rniLitary independencer 'the flrns'bave
. Q[ite separately conducted the, same research, .carried. out the sane triale, and,
with the suppgrt. of, the public euttloritieer 6et up thi  satne nesearch, infra-
etrudture.
. fwo, opportunlties  were missed in the eixtiee:  :
the f,irstria  the civil  aircraft  sector, wae the fact that tbe Airbus proJect
-r^.-r-
*a6-reEnched without the participation of the British Government  and with lan
Anerican engine, while Hawksr-Sidde1ey's  Lndustrial participation Te6 ltept up.
At tbe same tirae, with Rolls-Royce cupplylne Lockheed with the 8B.21l,.engine
for its  Tristar aircraft,  a conflict of conmercial  ancl poLitical lnterests
diqided the European industry ;  .the Airbus with. i'ts American. CF '5 engine and
,the Tristar'with its  Rolls*foyce  engine,w€FG in eonpetition on all  the tuorld
narketsriac1udingt.bepurchasesnadebyB.PitishAirways.,
.,Ihg-gEEg3gr in..the nilitary.sectorr.,is the similar.dg.ep .division caused by..
Francers non-participatiqg itt;the MRC,A projedt. ,  :, ...
a
tA-b-
e' Tlq qqale of the al+gr3ft co4-q-,b-cqctrPn iltdugt{g
Tn !9?1 the Community aerospace sector had a turnover of 5 99O rl uoe.o  1
compared rxith 16 368 m; u"a. for'the US aerospace sector'
Between 11969 
^nA tg?j the European lndustry registered an annuaL turnorrer
growth rate' of 6.6r/r., compared rrrith a 2?Y" decrease in the United States over
tlre safte period.  While the European industryfs turncver r"p""senteC. L6l6
of the US lndustry in  1969,, it  had growh to 29i"4 by 1973. The rmportance-
ii  riiit""v  U""f"l*"  f*'iiiustrated  by the fact that it  represents  52"5%
of the total  turnover register"A Uy tie  SEC aerospac'e sector and ?Al21i'
in the United States, The increase in-the European turnove,r is  du9. !o ths
miliq,ary s*e."-, tg Ooul {  coniiacls' to,,q3}99- 9I
epareg for -.civ_il gitg:raft t{pes thal-haLe beet-in-€9lYl9e-l'or +-nll.osl*9l
F'a  iiag- qgt ueen aue tS
substantial sales of new civil  aircraft.
A breakdown of the aerospace sectot' s  turnover figures ascording to the basic
,types of customer shows that the State accounts fot  58.3%, the civil  dones'bic
ti,.;Xut Il"4:l.and exports 30.3%; the equivalent figures for the United States
are 5L "5%. 20 "9:.', and 2f " 676 respectively.
Governments are therefore important customefs of the European aircraft
construction induqtry.  It  should hor*ever be noted that EEC Governmetrt:_ 
.
intervene in the civil  and military sector by means of p,urchases and R&D'
contraets,  .whereas in the United States"the Federal. Adninistration is rnatnly
concerned with military business and military  . RD  contracts.
The EECf s aerospace sector. employed 4o5 505 persons in I9?3,famnaref w||lt
435 551 in ]959.  This drop in  emplolnent of appr-oxinateLy 7% is baeically
due to r  "oiUu"k in numbers bmployed in the British industry and oII; the whole
it  rqflects an inprovement in productivity;  During this period, epplolrment
i"  t;;-;;";";;";  l""tot  aroppei bv 5?'5r i"  the united states and' bv 3r'9%
in Canada" while it  increa5ed by I2.6"f in Jlepan"  l
Prsductivity in the European industry as expressed in terms of added vatrue
or per capita i urnover, averag-es hal-f that of the American induqtry"
J" Activities and ammes oi  the 'aircraft  constlqctj-on' indqs'Lr ro
The following table shbws' as regards turbojets :
- the length of .Ane.rican production oeri-es ,and their long serviceg
- the Large number of'programmes launched by the European firms, sonetines
in cornp*tiAiot, and 
-*f,tuy" with series which, at best, have only just
. covered the iost-s, tiithout making a profiti"  :  '
Boeing 72O and 7A?
Boeing 727
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Parentheses indicatq that lhe progt.otm" has'been terminated'.
The Americang are aiso ahead ih tfre other elerospace sectors. In the
-Sg.lyl?i^?f i-a!i.on, sector, the United States produced approxlmately 14 OOO
airoraf E in,1973, compared with I  200 1n Europe, 35A oT them by. the French
subsidiary of an Anerican firm.  As regards turboprops-fgr  com+erci+l
a-ljnli*ggr the European industry"haF enjoyed considerable  .strccess with the
ffiFZZ  and the llawker-Siddeley ?48"
The European 'industry exhibits a remarkable  degree of competitivity and
dynamism as regards byginess Jet,s (approxinately ?3O have eo far been
produced in buropu ci@ffifT[-r  ]oo iq the ,united states) "l
A similar situation applies to }-elicoptgr producti on (71A hav.e been, produced
in Europe up to now conpared with l,3O0 in the Uni-ted States). 
,,.
The Europ€an j.ndustry has managed to produce competitive -?SSiIgg,altliougb the growing burden of .development coets has Led $urope's Leadlng enginer
manufacturers to establish cooperative links with the US prodilc€trB::e.6
regards the new 10 t"  engines"
In,the niilitarf, sector, a number of Duropean projecte have been deveLoped
on a cooperative basis.  Howeveri Europe did.not.manage tc adopt a common
policy in'the sixtles which r*ould have prevented the continuance'of '
disastrous competition in the key sector of advanced fighter aircraft.
Wheh in Lhe sixties the time came to conslder developing a joint  successor
'to'the jet  fighters of the existing generatS,on, there was a-breakdown in
negiotiatio4s,between the Unitecl Kingdon'and  France on a variable-geonetry
'aircraft.  The United (ingdomr the Federal Republic of Gernrany and 'Italy
therefore agreed.to develop the MRCA, which wiih orders for  around.SOO
aircraftl  is the most important Joirit programme at predent; Francefs
p6n-participation in this MRCA programme has created a very deep,division  of
intereets in this sector at European level,  This lack'of soLidarity of
iriteres.ts has been displayed on other: occasions : the development of two
diff,erent trainers, Dassaul-t-Dornierts  Alphajet and Hawker-Siddeley's
Hawk, and the fact,that the .Iaguar, developed jointLy by France"and the
Unlted Kingdon (BAC add DassauLt-Breguet), is in competition with  Dassaultfs
r" 1"
The Fact that Be1gium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway decided, in L975,
to repl-ace their F 1O4s by an Americaa, Aircqaft, wB61 q.uite apart from all
technical and.operati.onal coneiderationsl a logical conseguence of, these
divislons.  The absenc.e o.f any systenatic European purchasing pollcy neant
that the chances of obtaining a substantial share of the rharket for current
and future aircraft  had been wastedo  .
aviation market
The. general trend has been towards a rel-atJ.ve increase in the Community market,
conpared with that of the.United States.  Between 19?O awd Ig?3 the Eurdpean
narketts share cf the.Western narket rose from 14.?% to 18"2?/r, whlle that
of the United States dropped f,ron 63"9i6 to 5j%.  While the res"t of the
world's Ehare of the ruarket increased considerabl-y  between L973 and L.975t
tbat of the United $tatee felL to 45 "8',/o and tbe Comnunityrs remained etable






European producers did not benefit fron this trend, which ought to have
been favourable to non'.Arnerican nanufacturers"  The share of the markct
oecupied by Community production dropped, considerably between 1970 and
1975, as the foll,or^ring table shows  !
Comrnunity
Other Vlestern European countries
Europe
United States

























fhe combination of.these two trends -  the growth of the European market and
the drop in  the European industry's  share of the world markets -  resulted in
the period frorn f958 to I9?3 in  b balance of trade defi'cit  of $ 4 521- mill-ion
(1974), $ 2 695 mittion  on long-3ajge aircraft  and $ r  8a6 nillion'on  short
and medium-range aircraft  o
The forecasts of the value of Western civil  aviation markets between 19?5
and 1985 indicate that  the United States would accbunt for  just  under one
third  of the denand, the rest  of the world 4O il  and the Europea+ narket
a quarter.
The supply. capacity of the Eunopean industry will  obviously depend on the
political  and commercial decisions to- be taken as regards progranmes. Foreeast;:
have been made on the basis of differentassumptions : all  of  them suggest
that  the European t,rade balance will  register.a  deficit,  and according to
estimates:based. on the,!-east favourable..assumption  this'deficit  could exceed
$ 5 OOO miIlion"
5" T{re_ potential  of the aircr_aft co!€tryctf on pegtor, 
:
The state of operations in  the.sector reveals the existence of  expLoitable
potenti.al.  In the first  place, it  is  indisputable that  an Ov-erall assessnent
of  the Communi-ty  aerospace sectop could not be unfavourablb. This .sector has
constantly expanded its  aativities  (even calculated according to  constant
prices and'exphange ra!es);  its. tpchnological  standard is  excellent and its
design capacity is  certainly  no lower than that of the Arnerican industry.
ft  can thus be contended that  the European industry possesses the technical,
manpower and even financial. infrastructure  (given the rela.tive importance
of funds devoted to thi's sector) for  it  to regain an impontant position
on the world martket as a result  of, a rationalization  bffort  of whlch l.t  is
certai.nly capable" Secondly, the market prospects reveal a tendency that
may be extremely important for  the future of the European industry  :  the
expansion of the European na.rket and of that  of the rest  of the world
coupled.witil a relati.ve shrinking of the American market.  When the scale
in  value terms of the world market aE ,  forecast for  tho next ten years is
considered.,  this  trend opens ,qp na{ke!t pro6pects favourable for  p}anning
'1,  '/  "-9-
a satisfactory expanslon ln this sector.  nnirafyl the structure of
the world industry is also a reason for a rnajor effort'to  keep a strong
European lndustry in operation" Already, as regards the civil  aviation  ;
market, the United States possea€es only three large producers and one of  --'
thema].one,Boeing,hasa?2%shar.elnthewor1dmarketfor1ong-ran8e|.
alrcraft  and a 49 'l share in that for short- and medium-range aircraft  I .
trbrtbernore, the American industry is stil1  faced by strong pressure towards
more mergers" The best guarantee for European users tc.be in a position to
nake their purchases in competitive conditions will  be the exlstence of a
viable Suropean industry capabl.e of cooperating with other industries' such
. as those of Japan and the United Statesr on a basis which is not one of
dependen ee.
A igUrl ergsrqqms_. fgl.th-e__qoqs'!4ucttp_n  of Jgqee at-qgrs{t lor  civl}. av_i+!3q,+
!gIPsggs
1. M.arket prgspgcts
. Three conclusions werg drawn from the analyses conducted by tbe Conmission
in colLabbration with the European Aeronautical  Equipment Manufac'turefs
Association (AECMA) of, the data reLating, to existing progrannes and of the
market prospects  :
(i)  Europe should continue ts build short-and medium-range aircraft  with Lese
less than 10O. seats;
(ii),tnere  sboul.d be,a review of tbe stops which coul-d be taken to enable.the 'European industry to obtain a subetantial share of, the market for other
short- and ruedium-range  aircraft;
(lii)  the advisability of taking an initiative  in the long-yrnge aircraft  ,::,, .:
.  sector should be examinpd in detail.
The first  conclusion relat'es to the support to be given to existing progrannes
and the guirhntees that should be given to underpin thelr future development
in order to ruaintain and even e*pand Europers position on the r+orld market,  ,.
which tbough aLready exceLLent (especially with the F ??r f  28 and HS 748)
could be jeopardiaed by new American projects.
The second conclueion involves the deLicate decisions which will  have to
be tffin  the near futuEe. Europe will  first  have. to decide its'target
ehare of the forthcorning rnarket for twin-engine ai'rcraft wlttr a seating
capacity of 140 to L50" These wilL be planes equipped'with n6w engines with
a distinctly  irnproved fuel-consumption  and sound-leve} performahce.  The
European industry has three proJects for the further developurent of three
exisiting aircraft  (Mercure, BAC 111- and Trident).  A European solution must
also be fqund to tbe problem arising from ltalian  eollaboration with Boeing
on the ? x ? programme (a three-engined  plane with approxlmately 2OO seats),
in view of the competition that a programme of this type could entail for
another European programne, the Airbus, in the projected reduced-capacity
B lO version"
Finally, Europe must make evetry effort to ensure that the Airbus project,
the nost irnportant cooperation  programfie attempted up.t'o now, wilL receive all




As to the tbird  conclusion, Concorde remains the only exi6ting progra.nme
and its  pr@t6  are hard to  sum up before it  effectively  enters service"
The decisions to be taken in  the long-range sector would be those connected
with the launching of a new programmen a four-engined aircraft  wlth a
seating capacity of  20O r,rhich could sueceed the 7O? and DC 8"  Here too
the Airbus seems to be the most likely  starting-point,  in  its  B 11 version.
2. TLe-_pri4clp}_es on whislr- the i.oi{rt ptqg{e!q4!e slrould be- baFl{
This range of problems and the choices to be nade shoul-d be tackled according
to the following principles  :
-  al1 lndgstrial  activities  in  this  sector, including those conducted in
cooperation with the industry of roil*fietn€ber countries, must form a
consistent part  of an overall  programme;
-  the work must be shared out in  the most balanced way possibJ-e, reflecting
the capacity and potential  of  eaeh partner;
-  the timetable for  the joint  programne nust be taken into  account when the
work is  shared out,  so tha.t every partner bears abalanced burden over the
whole of the period in  question;
-  a joint  prt'granme for  civil  aircraft  would have extremely important
consequences for  the propulsion systen sub-sector; larger  sales will
strengthen its  tectrnological independence, which could be undermined by
excessi.re rlependence on the US industry.  The fate  of the airframe and
propulsion sub-sectors is  so closely inter-related  that  they cannot survive
uithout  each other;
-  the consequences of  such a progranme fFr  the' equipment sub-sector must
be considered in  order to  encourage cooperative schemes for  the development
of certain systems and sub-systems for  the aircraft  and engines of  the
joint  programme;
-  as civil  and rnilitary  activities  overlap as far  as industry is  concernedt
the balance sought above vrill  be encouraged considerably if  progress is
nade simultaneously in  tho military  aircraft  construction sector"KOMMfSSTONEN  FOR DE EUROPTETSKE FTELLESSKABERS  -  KOMMTSSION  DER EUROpiTSCHEN  GEMETNSCHAFTEN-T  -  )o n  .-J  I COMMlfsloirl  OF THE EURoPEAN.coMMUNITIES -  coMMlssloN DEs coMMUNAUTES  EURoPEENNES -  |  l--  > O 
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FROG&{I.N.M DIACTION POUR LIA'MOI{AUTIQUE  ETJROPEfiVNE
La Comnission vient d.e saisir Ie Conseil drune communication  sur les oond.itions
d.e fonctionnement d.e lrindustrie;r,6ronautique  d.ans Ia Commmunaut6 et sur les mesures
n€cessaires i  son d.6veloppement.
Cette communication  d.e la Commission est assortie d.run progr6nne d.ra,ction qui tient
cornpte d.es implications existarrtes entre les aspects industriels, civils  et mili-
taires d.ans le secteur a6ronautique drune part et les aspects relatifs  au transport
a6rien dtautre pa$t. La Coronission  estime que les gouvernements ile La Communaut6
ont une d.6cision fondarnentale A, prendre. ftr effet le refus de leur Fart de saisir
les nouvelles chances qui se pr6sentent d.ans lc sqcteur a6ronautique ct la conti-
nuation d.es politigues nationales conduiraient i  ]a. disparition d.rune industrio
europ6enne autonome en mati6re a€ronautique.  Saisir los nouvelLes chences signifie
d6sormais accepter de mettre lrindustrie  adronautique dans Le cad.re d.tune v6ritable
politique commune en d.otant la Communaut6 de moyens n6oessaires pour la r6aliser
rlans lcs domaines ind.ustrieJ, cornmercia]l et du transport.
Le progranme draction propos6 par }a Commission figurc dans cette notc dfinformation
avec ccs dcux annexes lrun illustrant  la situati.on a.ctuelle d.e lra6ronautiquc  europ6er-
ner lrautre i-ncliguant les lignes sur lf 6tablissemgat  drun progra,rnme  conmun d.ranrions
d.e transport civil.
r com{ (1il +ls-1-
r.D*es_!€c_is]-qry_€q4dry$_!81_e-s*_sqq]:J-:+g{trs!_{i9_-eg-os€e_t-+g
Le d-6veloppement d.c ltind.ustric a6ronautique, par ltapport important de techno-
logies nouvelles qutil  implique, d.emand.c des stratdgics claires, une planification
b, long terme syst6matique  ct une.gestion coh6rentc. iin outre, i}  demand.er d,u fait
du niveau 61ev6 d.es investissements qui doivent Gtre mis en oeuvre, unc lsrgc
assise financiEre, des financements sff.rs, de bonncs perspectives d,e marchdl iI
exige enfin que soient 6vit6es les formes d.e gaspilla6e provogut3es par 1a dupli*
cation des efforts et par les occasions d.e rationalisation perdues,
Les gouvernements d"e 1a Comrnunaut6  ont ainsi unc d,6cision fond.arnentalc A. prend.r':"
Le refus d,e saisir les nouvelles chances gui se pr6sentent et la continuation  dis
politiques nationales centrifuges conduiraient i, 1a d.isparition  d tune industrie
a6ronoutique europ6enne autonome,  ce qui aurait d.es consdguences  n6fastos sur
lravenir 6conomique et politique d"e la Communaut6 (voir.lnnexe I  pour Itillustraticn
d.e la situation actue]le ti-e lrind.ustrie a6ronautj-que). _Par contre, des possibilit6s
importantes stouvriront si leB gouvernernents sont Fr6ts i  d.6passer 1e stade d runc
coop6ration intergouvernemcntale entre d.iverses politiques a6ronautiques qui rcs-
teraient nationales
et stils  acceptent d.e mettre lrind-ustrie a6ror:,outique sous
la tutelle  d.e Ia Communaut6,  cn la d"otant d.es moyens n6cessaires
pour r6ali-ser pour ce secteur une politique commune, ind-ustrieller commerciaLe et
du transport.
II.  Le rnerche
Le march6p et sp6cialement  le march6 int6rieurp est 1a premibre r6a1it6 A. prend.re
en consid.6ration quand. on examine les probllraes d.e d.6velOppe.Feqt  de lrindustrie.
Lrindustrie a6ronautique europ6enne peut solidement fonder son avenir seulement sur
sa capacit6 propre de satisfaire les besoins d.es utilisateurs,  d.€finis dans des
conditions .de concurrence du march6, aussi bien i. 1t j-ntsirieur  qutA, lrextr5rieur.
En outre, il  est 6vid.ent gue f  ind.ustrie a6ronautiqug ne peut esp6rer atteindre
une p6n6iration 61ev6e sur 1es narch&dtexportation (et ceux-ci lui  sont essentiels)
oil la comp6tition est la plus aiguc, si  el}e cst progressivement exclue sur son
propre rnerch6.
Le fait  que la mQmc ind.ustric alimente aussi bien le march6 civil  que le march6
nrilitaire,  et que'ce dernier absor'oe plus d"e 60 lL d.e 1a production a6rcnautique,
rend.rait d.6pourvue d.e signification toute politj-que  corTlrilune qui voud.rait se can-
tonner b. la partie civile  en ignorant le marchd rnilitaire.-2-
a) Lc r:a"f'chi_ civil  europ€gjl
Lt6tablisscnent d.rune politique adronautiqtre europ6enne suppose 1a r6alisation dtun
v6ritable march6 ut.*op6"n.  Une politigue du ir,nsport a6rien qui -  aux terrnes du
Tr,;li*6 -  rrrrylricrt un accord. unanime du Conscil , nta pas 6t6 d.6cid"6e jusqulicl ,ett
de ce fa,it, lcs services a6riens intraeurop6ens  sont 1e r6sultat clrarra'ngemcnts
qui trouvont leur base d.ans cles systdrnes rnondlaux.
La Comgission  consid-brc que lron clevrait viser d il6passer la situation actuclls ca-
ract6ris6c par lrexistcnce do raarch6s natione,ux rigid.cment cloisonn6s,  clans lesquels
Iracc6s au trafic  est r6parti cssentiellerneirt cn fonction de la nationatitd d'es com-
pagnies d-c navigation a6riooflcsr
Un r6ccn.'r; arr€t cle la Cour de Jus-bice (l.taffaire t6l/ru)  a d-6c1ar6 lfapplicabilit6
des rbgles g6ni:rales du Trai"t6 aux transpor-bs e,6riens" La Commission en examine actuel-
lement lcs cons6guences  avec le  concours des experts cles Etats membres. Une te1le ap-
;;";i"  cloi-L 6trc cornpl6t6e par ltad.option en rndire -bemps par la Communaut<l clfune poli-
tique coifim;rne visant'5 la ci6ati'on d-run marchd communautaire se substituant aux rdgi-
mes existan,cs ct d.ont.la r6alisation ne pourreit 6tre que graduelle, cornpte tctru clcr
la corrrplexit6 cles problbmes existants.
Cette politique aurait eolTlrne objcctifs g<':n6':r'ux  I
a) la cr6ation dtun espace a6rien europdcnr 8616 au niveau cornniunautaire, r6ali-
san-i;, en ce qui conccrne fe'brafic  in'tracomntunautaire,  un rregirne cle concuFruil-
ce r<iglcrnent6e d.ans le but droffrir  au public des services rnieux aclaptds b s':s
bcsoins, aux meillcurs prix,  i. travers itinnovation et la rliversification de
.  ccs scrvioes et Ia rationalisation dcs sti:uctures  des r6seaux, nota'rnmcnt dans
lcs transPorLs interr6gionaux;
b) fa ntigociation  en comrnun cfcs accorCs a.r'cc les pays tiers,  noteummcnt en ce qui
concer.ne les d.roits clc i;rafic,  ce qui aui'ait comme effet un renforcerricnt dti
pouvoir Ce n6gociation d.c la iommunauti c-b une optimisation d-es routes et ser-
viccs intcrnati cne"uxr
Tout ceci aurait un impact inportant en cr6a,nt un milieu 6conomicnr'e propicc A' lrhar-
monisa-bion des crit6res qui son-b i  la basc c1,: la  structure des riseilux (frc3qucnces,
lignes,-i:aillc;;;-;;i;""i  nt gui conctitiorincnt ainsi lcs choix au rnomcnt clcs achats'
Dans l,c caC.rc d"rune politiqpc communautairc ainsi congue, permettant  notamment  'aux
compagirics  a6ri'enncs de participer cnsemble ir la cl6finition d-es programmes atironau-
tiqucs curop6cns c-i rlc c"evenir ainsi ltinter'locutcur  n6cessaire ct valablc cle llin-
austrie, sc r6aliseraient lcs ccnclitions 1cs plus favorables pour une convergenco
des erigences cle comp6titivitei au plan rronclial c.es compagnies a6riennes  e-b cLe presta-
tions clcs technologils les plus ,rvanc6es  d-e la part d-e l-tinclustrie a6ronautirlue euro-
p6ennc.
b)Lnln@
La r6ptitition des d.6veloppements  au nivcau na.tional et les cofits d-e supports logisli-
qrr*s n,rftiplcs et dc *y"lb*""  s6par6s pour l':rs- pi6ces de rechange provoil 1311{ 1t3s tnag-
vaise ubilisation cle ressource" firr*"idres  pubi-iqr.ies . En-ou-bre, lcs.cliffi:renccs
a*"" r"r  6qu.ipements adronauiiques.europdens-ainsi  que dans {'au.tr11 :g"lT-:tl-l-
rnili-baires de technologie ava"tc<ic (Oq..ip""onts tilcctroniques)  ont aussj' dcs et't'ets
n6fastes sur 1e plan op6ratiorrrrei  ip""-i""*plc,  la granae clivcrsit6 des typcs clraviorrr';
et des iquipemcni" "n 
Lntra.tnant d;;  incompitii:irites  par rapport atlx ins'ballations
de service pose dcs probl6rnes consid-6rables pour Irutj-Iisation
.1.-3-
par 1es forces e6riennes, d,es diff drents teru."tins  d"c l.tOTiltr). Si ltint6r3t
d court ternc des fournisseurs  d.t:rmes am6ricains senbll nrofitcr  dcs divisions
europSennes qui leur ont permis d-f obtenir' des contrrJs -bels qur cclui dcs qu--.t:":
paye europ6ens pour lrachi* d"u F 15, lrint6r3t;i  l-onp; terme d-es;rncSric:.ins,  co:-:rl
cclui dcs Europ6cns,  senblc Stre dans fa crd':tion d.runc. structur: curopd;nnl cohd-
rcnte pour lus."chats d-rr.rncs qui pcrncttre a Ia capacit6 industriellc dc 1r.i;)uropc
d.e contribuer plus 6cononiquement A lrcffort  conjoini de d.6fense.
^, ^-++^  -P;-  1^^ ra veeus rrrrr rwo gou-vernenents d.cs pays ncnbrcs d"cvraient d.6cid-er d.c cr6er unc
Agence cornlrun.:  df achats a6ronautiqucs ;lilit'-'Lires chargdc du d6veloppencnt  conjoint
et cles:chats drarmenents.)6rona,utiques  devant rt3pondre a la d.cnand.e d"cs forces
arn6cs curop6ennes. El1e pourrait Otre un organe ed hoc, travaillant  en liaison
onnrnnri6^ .-',.^ lcs ltinistbres nationaux corirp6tents, et coop<lrant 6troitenent avoc
1a Cornmission pour pernettrc b cclle-ci  d"e g6rer Ia politique ind.ustriel]e a6rona"u-
tique cn poss6dant butes 1cs d,onn6es n6cess,rires. lLtAgencc d"eviendrait un organc cle
lfUnion 0uron6cnne le jour oi. celle-ci serl institu6c.
LtAgencc d.cvrrit notannent  :
a) coorclonner 1e d-emand.e  des forces a6rienncs europ6enncs pour qutelles fr,sscnt
usa€ie syst6r:ia,tiquencnt et d-.. fagon stand.ard.is6c dcs avions militaires  europ6ciir-
rrvistnnts  norrp flgs miSsiOls cOinpa"rableS d,ans les diverscs arp6es de lrair; "y..*.r.lyi,J',v4vv
h\  '; Ao.+ifi.rr'l^s besoins connuns fUturs qul exigcraient  d-e nouveaUX  d.6Ve1oppCi.ti,n-bi
conmuns e
Une politique :urop6enne pour 1rach.:J d.es arnements a6ron.:ruticlues devrait 6trc
acconpagn6e de Ciscussions rrcc 1cs Etats-Unis avcc l,ls objectifs suivants :
i)  ouvorturr: mutuelle des narch6s vers un d-6veloppenent irnportEnt et 6qui1i'b::6
d,u cormerce transatlantique dxs fes clcux sens'l
ii)  nssurcr quc Itlfurope:it  un rOlc.tans tous les scctcurs nljeurs de
t e chnologi-c.-4-
III,  Urre pol_rtique conrniunq poqr-Lll-n{@g
Pour assuler un avenir A ltind.ustrie a6ronautique dans ia Communaut6, il  apparai,;
6vj.d.ent qutll  faut d"6passer 1e stade cles'coop6rations  in'Ler-gou',rernementaies  entre
d.j-verses politicpres a6ronautiques qui Susugutd pr6sen'; son-b rest6ers natlonales.
A cette fin  }a tr-rtelle de lrind"ustrie a6rohautique clevrai-b 6tre er:erc6e par la
Cornmunaut6"
Le cadre d"e gesti-on de la politique de la Communaut6  pour lti-ndurst;rie a6ronau-i;-iclrri:
serait celui olre connait d.6ja 1a Communaute5 d-ans d.rau-i;res C.omaines; crest*i,-dir,;  l
agissant sur ilroposr.-bion de Ia Comrnission, aprbs consu.lta-bion.d"u Farlement Euro;t,.:cn,
1e Conseil prend.rait 1es grandes d€crsions politiques portant sur 1es progralitmes,
le financemen-L communautai-re et les accords internationaux relatif's  d. ce secteur.
Sur base de ces d-<!cisions, ]a Coinmission  assumerai-b la 6.:stion nScessaire cle lri
politique a6ronautique  comnune et prendrait les mesu,res n6cessaires pour consul.'Ler
]es utilisa'l;eurs, les prod.ucteurs, les syndicats et les autorlt6s nationales.
La Commission organiserait 1a gestion rle Ia polrtique adronautique de fagon  ai
utiliser  am maxirnum les structures na',,ionafes existan'tes et i  rechercher la plus
grand.e d6cen-lralisation d.es ac tivi':;6s"
Le financernent communautaire d.e 1a politique adronautique ne staSouterait pas aux
financements nationaux mai-s i-l les rernplacerait au fur  e-b A mesure de sa mise en
oeuvre.
Les rbgles cle la gestion financibrc d.evraient €tre 6tablies de fagon ir. garantir
d.rune part, en cc qui concerne les cngagements bud.g6taircsr  eue lc,s d6cisions
pluriannuelles prises par 1e Conseii correspond.ent  ir, ltarnpleur du progra.rnme commun,
d.rautre part qr-re la Commissioni  charg6e de la gestion, puisse avoir recours au
march6 des capitaux et effectuer les <l6penses n6cessi',ires conformdment i  fravance-
ment d.e la rdelisation d.u progranilc"
Cette poli biciue comporterait notammen'u :
-  fe rassemblement de toutes fes activit6s a6ronautiqucs d.e".ns le d.omaine de la
construc-bion des grancls avions d.e transport civ1l dans 1e cad"re drun progreirrl;j
coh6rent, assurant ltutilisation  optimale des ressourccs;
-  Irinstauration  d.rune coop6ration 6troite entre industlie? compagnies de naviga-, r,-,li
a6rienne ct pouvoi-rs publics pour les choix ir effectuelr en vue d"e la r6alisatior',
d.u programme  communi
-  lt6tablisscilent  d.run progra.mme commun de Recherche dc base;
-  Ia mise en oeuvre d.tun financemen"b pommunautaire;
-  Ia gestion dcs relations avec 1cs pays tiers;  aussl bien celles concernant Ia
coop6ration lndustrielle avec d-cs partenaires de ces pa,Jrsr Que la stratdgie
commcrcialc  pour Ia p6n6tration sur Ics marchds drcxporLa'bion,
-  les travaux Crharmonisation en raatii:re d,e d,i-sposi-'bions l6gislatlves ou ad.nrinistra-
tives au sujet des certifications d-e navrgabilit6 et dc nuisances ainsi c1rrtst
g6n6ra1 ,  tous les problbmes  de norrnalisation et stand-i.rd-isation.-)-
Une telle  politique devrait en outre promouvoir une struc-bure inclustrielle
permanente, a,u moj.ns pour les gra,nd.s avions civils,  notanmcn'L  d.ans 1es domaines
d-u aar]<eting et du service aprbs-vente, fond6e sur les cxp6riences acquises
jusquf ici  d.a.ns 1a coop6ration;  ceci pcmettra d trind.ustrie d.tamt5liorer  sa
prod-uctivrt6, et atteindre aj-nsi -l,ous les b6n6fices d.runl rationalisation euro,trirli;r
La premibrc cl6cision que le Conscil- cst d.onc appcl6 :r prcnd-re sur base de propor.-li;i.r
d"e 1a Commission, conccrne lradopbion clu principe d-run urograrnmc europ6en,  sor.l-irlr:ll
par un fina.ncqlent commun et qui d.evra Otre 61abor6 avcc l.  participation des
constructeurs ct des compagnies d-e navigation a6rj-enne dc }a Conrnunaut6.
I1 faut notcr enfin,. d.ans lrindustric  a6ronautigue, gurun ensemble sp6cifique d.e
relations cxlste entre ltentreprise industrielle et les gollvcrnements" Eien qurr.rr:c
part substan-Lielle de. cette ind"us-Lrre soit  en L'urope propri6l;6 publique, i1 d-emeurc
essentiel pou-r l-tindustrie  d.e garcler l-a responsabilit6 prcnibre pour I'identifica-
tion dcs actions commerciales 1es plus opportunes, pour ltengagement des risclues
et Ia gos-bioir des ressources ndcessaires.-6-
LA sIIU{qrg}T pq sEcjlElrR slRoJ4urrarryr
1o Les raisons des d"ifficr-rli6s actuelles d.u sectei"r.r
Da.:rs le contexte conjoncturel difficile  actuel toutes les lj-mites d.es
formr.rles d.e coop6ration  adopt6es et toutes les con-braclictiorrs des
politiques nationales suivies jusqutici sont apparrles avec une 6vidence
accrue" Du fait  des hauts coff.ts de cl6veloppement e-b de la n6cessit6  cle
les r6partir et d-c'avoir accbs h d"e plus larges march6s, tous fes d.6ve-
Ioppements civils  les plu-s r6cents (Ooncorcle,  Airbus, Fokker-VFI,J 514,
'tr 2A1 l4ercure) ont comport6 une collaboration europ6enne sous une forme
ou une autre" La coop6ratj-on i-ntra-communautaire a cependant, montr6 ses
fai-blesses" Pour comnencer,  1es prograrnmes r6a1is6s en coop6ration  bFou-
tri-lat6rales  ne se sont pas ins6r6s clans un cad.r'e uni-que et coh6rent"
le plus, 1a coop6ratron a nort6 essentiellernent sur la phase d.e d.6ve-
loppement et cie fabrication d-es s6ries et moins sur la phase de comnier-
cialisatj-on" La fragmentation des efforts au niveau cleventesa d.6ter--
min6 une prognanroation  orient6e vers les objectifs technologiques  plus
que vers d-es objectifs d.e march6" Des motj-vations de concurrence  commer--
ciale et drincldpendance militaire  ont incit6  les errtreprises  b procdd-er
seules aux m6mes recherches, i  d6velopper 1es r'r6mes expdrierices et b
cr6er avec Itaid.e d"es pouvoirs publics les n6mes infrastructures  d.e
recherche.
Pend.ant les a.irn6es 60, deux occasions oirt 6t6 ma"ncrrr6es:
Lq premilrq clans le d"omaine c1e l-'a6ronautique civrle  a 6t6 le fait  que }e
projet Airbus, a 6t6 1a.nc6 sans l-a. oariicrpati-on  du gouvernement britannique
et avec un moter-ir am6ricain, alors que ]:L parti-ci-pation intlu.strielle d.e
Ilaltker-SiCdeley 6tait  rnalntenue" En rndrne temps, t?o1l-s-RoJrcer  fournissant le
moteur P'B 211 b Lockheecl  pour son avion Tristar,  un conflj-t d.tint6r6t
cornmercial et pol1t ique d"ivi sait I I industrie europ6enne,  1 t.A.irbus avec
son moteur am6ricain  Ctr 5 et Ie Tristar avec son moteur Rolls-Royce  se
trouvan-b en concurrence sur toas les march6s mondi-aux, y compris pour
les acha-bs c1e Sritish  Airrvays.
I,a-4pqEi-b+q dans Le domaine milj-taire consiste  d.arns 1a division profonde
et analogue qul seest cr66e b la suite de lrabse:rce de 1a France dans le
projet ItllCA,
2 " L_q -pqi4S Ae_1,'rtl@plq_i-e_a€r_o_nqIlt  qqq
yn 1973 le secteu-r adrospatj-al  de la Cornnunaut6 avait un chiffre  d.raffaires
Ce 5"?90 millions dtlJCl celur des Etats-Unis 16.36; millions.
Ltindustrie  europ6enne de 1)69 e i'i.73 a connu un talur annuel moyen d.e pro-
gresslon C.e son chiffre  cl.eaffaires d.e 5r6,,; pend.ant la m6me p6riod.e 1es
-jtats-Un.r-s ont connu une d.iminirtion de 2l'i"" Alors clue Ie chiffre  deaffaires
d.e lrindustrj-e europ6enne reprdsentait 15'f, de celui de leind.ustrie  d.es
Etats-Un:.s en 1!6!, en 1973 ce pourcentag'e atteignait 29'/'"" L? rnrportance
d-es affaires militaires  est ind.iqude par te fait  qutils  repr6sentent 6216i'"
du total  du chlffre d-raffaires du secteur a6rospaiial d-e Ia C"E"Jtr", contre
-^  a^i
70r7'h aux Etats-unis.  L-a prq.lre"qglq_n _4i.1 ql]rff{e 4.!rrffqi,qEr, - j+rqp€qii e.st_,-rluq
Sg":eni.gF_ n]1_i!ql-L9s,_ a  ::gJ'e*@
ai:.t ventes d.e pibce de rechasrgc pour d-es avj-ons civlls  d.ont les  sdries  sont
ff-."'*T*
Lqilq6e.s- de_pll]-q- 4q- pplqb,qe.ilFqq.  _qnqg.cq_, i  cel.le--4es.r:,fopjg_lse_urE:  _elle_ pt__e.st
-^^ 'i '^ i''^-"?ici  D. ci-es ventcs iiriportanbes  de noliv':c,ux avions civils" _il9F= _L{uL_q.-,r  nPV.Y-  _ _ _-7 -
Si- lron r6,Dartit le chiffre  deaffa|res du secteur a6rospa-bia1 par
grancLes cat6gories de clients f tor. constate que lt]ltat  afimente 58r3iL, Le
ma.rch6 intdrj-eur civil  11r4'k et 1?erportation lO,3'1,/" ae ce chiffre
cl-'affairesi pour les Etats-Unis les chiffres corresponclan'bs  sont 51rif",
)n  orl- ,^+ lt  A,1 LwtTlJ  UU  Lltv,::o
Les Etats reprdsentent d.onc d-es clients importants de lrrnclustrie  a6ro-
^^,,+ 
-.i rr@u!ur.1*v. o*,-p6enne"  Ce;oenda,nt i1 fau-b remarguer que d.ans la C"E"E. les
'-'^+^ rntervieivrent cla.ns le secteur sivil  et militaire  par d.es r:ju 4 V 9r  IlslllvII  U
achats et des contrats  r? i: l,  al-ors qutaux EtaJs--Unis le Gouvernement
f6d6ra1 i-ntervier:t esscntrell::ment pour des affaires mrliatires et des
contrats d.e R ic D milltaires"
Le sectcur a6rospatial rlaas la  CEE occulrait en 1973, 406"60, personnest
alors qutil  en occupatt l.Jr1"!51 en 1)69" Cette baisse tlc l-temploi d-renvi-
ari roit 7"tb est dfle essentiellement  b, une ciiminutron d"cs effectifs  d-ans
1?industrie briteunique ct globa,.lement  elle reflbte une am6lioration cle la
product jvitd"  Pend-a,nt cctte nrdme p6;'iode lremploi i;.ans les activitds
adrospr-tia.lcs diminr,rait aux Etats-Unrs d.e l2 r3ui,, au Canacla d.e 31 t9"f,
i,arrdis que i-l augrnentait  cl"e 1276'/o au Jairon"
La prod.uctivrt6  cxpri-m6e en tcrmes clc valeur ajout6c ou ciriffre d.taffaircs
par )ersonnc occup6e d.ans ltindustrie  europ6ei'r.ne sr6l-bve cn moyenne  b.
}a moit16 de celle de ltindustr:e  arn6ri-caine.
j . 3q-t r-r@  f. i. i;l$-+ qt r i-q---a,€q q.naq!-r q!.€
Le tajoleau sui.vant p6rn:t de consi;aber en ce qui- concerne les -t-illbor6ac-t-eqr-q
-  d.lune part la longueur d.es s6nes de programmes am6ri-cains et leur
I nnfcl/r  TA.
*  r'lrarrfro n:r{  fs nombre 6}ev6 d.c lrrograrrunes lancds par'ltinclustrie europ6ennet
parfoi s en concurrence entre eux, et toujours avec des s6ries gui d.ans la
mej-lleure cles hyoothbses onl tou-b juste perra1"s dtatteindre le nlveau des
d6penlcs engag6es nais sans lc  dSpasser.
Turbo16ac-i; curs am6ri cains Turbor6act eurs europdens





































entrr:  na.rentlrhseq: nrcr.'''r'i?mmes termin6s
Total 859+o
-8*
En ce qui concerne les autres nat6riels a6rospatiaux otl constate
6galernent i,rne supGricrit6 am6ricaine. Dans.le clomaine de l:Ag.hj&1"_4
g,e gfglg  i1 y a eu en 1)lJ environ 1li."OOO avions prod-uits aux Etats-
Unis contre 1.200 prod.uits en Europe, Cont llO par l"a. filia.Ie  frangaise
d.rune firnie am6ricaine" Dans le dona.ine d.es lutbo_propu-Iseuls Glq Llg4ers
*c.91g[e_rq_t-4g-g, l.tind.ustric  europ6enne a connu des succbs -importarrts avec
notanrnent le Fokkcr 2'l et, lc Hawlccr-.Sidd.dley  748
t'industrie  eurol:6enne prSsentc un degr6 d.e comp6titivj-t6 et d.e Srnamisme
remarcg;rablcs pour lns ;|*s-*{gllgtr:qg  (environ ?30 urit6s ;:roduites
jusqu t ici  cn lurope contre 1 . 100 a''.rx Etat s-Unr s) .
Des consicl6ratror:.s e,neilog*cs sta,n'rligucnt b, la nrod.uction tlrh6licoptbres
(l3O prodrri-tcs jrsquf icr  en Europc contre 1"300 aux Etdts-Unis)"
En matibre d" *gjggg lliirc-ustric curr:p6cnne a su r6aliser d.es produits
conrp6titifs, bien quc la charge croissante des cofi.ts d.e cl-dveloppement  a
condui-b les principaru: rirotoristes curop6ens b 6tablir  dos liens d-e coop6'-
ration avec les prodr-icteur.s d"es lltats*Unis pour les nouveau".c moteurs
d.e 10 toirncs"
Lc d-oma.r-nc mi-litaire a connll le cl6veloppcmcn'u  tl ?u;te s6rie de projets
europ6ens en coll-aboratj"on.  LrE'"r-rope nta ccpenda.nt  pas su adoptcr ttne
r:olitiqr,rc cofimune au cours d"es a:r:r6es 6o qui. aurait pu 6vi--ber le narntieir
d-lune comp6tition cl6sastrellse  cl"a,ns le d.omaj-ne-c16 des arrions de combat
avanc6s,,
Quanct- le tenps vint  air cours des ann6es 1!60, ,l-r: consrd,6rer }e il6vcloppemcn-t
rlrun sr-r.ccesseur coilrrrrun arur avrons d-e combab l, r6action de}a g6i:6raiion
existarr-Le, les n6gocia'.tions entre }a Granti-e"-Bre-l  .t.gne ct  la" Ilrance sur i1n
6ventuel avion d g6om€tric variable 6choubrent" La Grarrcle-Bretagne, }a
RllA e'r, ltItali.c  sc,n]r-rcnt alorr, dtaccord pour cldvelopper 1e ltRCA, euir evcc
rrn chi-ffre d.e coinmancles d.e l-rord.re rl-e 3O0 unit6s, consti,'bur:le plus iinpor-^
tan'L programme commun actuel-, Lrabsence dc la lfrance da:rs ce programme
I,IRCA creusa urle trbs profond-e c]-rvergence dt:-nt6r6t d.ans ce domaine au
scin d-c ltEurope. Le manque d-c solid.a::i.t6 d?intdr6t ste,st inani-fest6  clans
cl-rarrtrcs occasilons: le d.6veloppemcnt  iLe cleux avlons d.?entrainernent  d,iff6--
rcir-ts: 1r Alphajct clc Dassault-Dorni-cr, 1c Hawk d.,-' I{awlier.-Srdde}ey, et
aussi ila:rs le fait  que J-e Ja6prar i'rer.noo*anglars  d6ve1opp6  oonjointement
(OAC e-t Dassarlt-Br6,3uet)  stcst irouv6 cn comp6tibion avcc ltavion  d.e
Dassaul-i: F 1"
O;nand cn 1)75t la Selgiguc, lcs Pays*i3as, 1e Dernemarlc, et .La Norvbge durcnt
d6cirlcr ciu rcnlrlaccrnent  c1e ler-i-rs.ll 104, }e choix d.?un avion arndricain,  en
d.ehors de ton1"* consj,cl"6ratJ-ons  tcchniclues ou- op6rationnelles,  fu-i; une
consdrl*cncc logiquc cl.c ces ciivisioLrs" Par Itabsence dtune politiquc europ6en*
ne syst6nl.iroue dtachats, les chmccs Ce prencLrc une place importante sur
le marcir6 nour les arrions cris-brurts et les avions fr-rturs furcnt perclues.
!s-'!-?LegiSe*L:?9M
La tenclance g6ndrale a 6t6 cl-ans l.e sens d.r'.m accroissement  de Irinl:ortaircc
du marchd de Ia Communa"ut6  au- d6tri-ncnt Cc ce]lc d"cs tritats--llnis. intre
1970 et  197 j  le ma,rch6 eu-ropicn cst pass6 d.e 14r7't, b t3,2'l clu rnarch6
occi-dcntal, alors quc cel,ri- des ltrtats--Unis passait cle 53,9'," e 53"/""
,lntre 1973 et, 1975 si Ia part clu- rnarch6 du rcste Cu monr1e a fortement
orogress6, cclle cles ltrta-bs-Unis a dimirtu6 jusqir.'i 45r3'/";cc-l-e  clc La
Cornmunar-rt5 stest sta,':11j-s6e b, l7 16'/r"-q-
La procr"uc-bion europ6eirne irta pas ll6ndficl6 ric cctte tencla;rcc.;ui-  aurait
dfi 6-bre favorable,  notamnent  aux constructeurs non amdricains" iln
effct  la part cle produi--bs cor:mi'rna;utaircs  molttre partout Jne regrcssion
irnportairte au cours de la pr5riode 197C*1975? cornmc il  r6sulte clu tableau
sui-vant:
:219  197-5. 6volut ion
Corarn'rnarr--L  6
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Le cunr-rl cle ccs deux tcndarlccs clc croissr;1ce cn cc qu-i- col'rccrne Ic
merch6 crlron6en ct  d-c r6grcision un ac qui conccrr.lc lf. Iiart d.c 1?ind.usl,ric
euroT:6cnnc sur tous les rnarch6s, stcst i;re.d-uit i)orr ]a p6ri"od.c 1953*1973
c"La,ns un solde n6gar,tif clc la l:alancc commerciele dr"r sectcr.lr 6ga1 b,4.521
millj-ons cle c'l,o}1ars (1914), 2"6)5 n:llrorrs poul: i;s  longs courri-crs et
1"326 millions pour 1es courts e-b no.ycnii cou.rlfcts"
Lcs estima-bions,le la val.eu"r d-es r:rarch6s occi-deniales d-o:: avions c]-e
tg.nsir6r^l- ::irr1 I  nour  lr.  -r6'rio,'l c  1ii.,/11J5  in6linrrlnt  r^rrr-. r:lr.rroXima,tiVcmCit'L' ,./  |  J/  |
^-X^ ,l r,.-  +.; -.- ur uD LL ur. u ,-;f s rcv:-crrcr.rait a.t-: il'Le.ls-.iJnis, {O;i coirccrncrait l-e rcste
du mond-c alol^s ci-rc lc  marcl,5 curop''-.cir rntcrvrcnclrai-t  r)onl: ru'I quart
de la  cLemancle  "
Quant I  Itoffre  d.c rrj-ndustric  europ6cnnc  i1- cst  6vj.dcn'c clurcllc  d6nendra
clcs cSci-s1or1s pol-: tiql'-cs et  comncrcialcs i  prcncirc cn irrrti-bre c-Lc prograJ,ulc,
lliffirnntcs  lqlnothbtes ont 6t6 L'i,,,.tcs: torl"bcs i::rcli.qucnt c1'"re 1c so-'l-de c'Le l-a
balarLcc corTt^mcrcialc curoir6cnnc ijui;-i ir6gatrl,  ct  sclo;r 1')'rypothbsc  pLus
n6ga-"ivc cc sold-c po:rrra,.i t  J5;lasscr !  nillrarcis  dc dofl.rrs,
tr)" Le -ootcnti ci  du sec-i;cur a6rona"r,.-bior-r"c
Lt6-bat c1c f onc'cionncn.ien-b  iLu- scctcu.r rnontrc ] 
E existcncc  de po"bentiali-b6s
qui pcr,rveat 6tre  valorj-s6cs" i1  cst  j-ncontestablc  en llr.jrnier lrcu  qurun
jugcnicn-b 3,1-;ir,ll sur l'.ita-L  drr srlctcrrr a6r'osira.till cornnuneutairc  nc pcut
pas Ot"r:c ndgatif .  L?ac-tj '"riti  tlc cc scctcur coruralt rrnc cxpa,nsion consta:rte
(mOmc calcuI.5 ir, ltrrx  c't -ba*r:l clc clirr;r1-3r constan'r,s); f o n:Lveau tcchnologiqu.c
est cxccllcnt  ct  1cs ceipacjt6s c1c coirccp'bion cert;aincncnt pas infSrieurs - b. ceu:t cl-c -l-tinflustrl-c anSrr-cai.irc, 0n itcrr-{ f,64" affirmcr  quc lcs  infrastruc--
tr,rrcs tccluriqu-cs irrrmaincs c-i; niOrne 'f rnancrbrcs ( r,',-r I t rmlrortance rclative  "lcs
foncl-s consacr"Ss D. cc sccteirr) cxistcnt  pour ciuc lt:Lnd-tt';trie euroir5cnue
reDrinne u:::'31e important sur l-c march6 mondj-al ,  gr.4"cc ). r,rn cffort  d"c
rational-r-sa'bi on q.r I c1lc cs'L ccrttincrncir-t  (l;.1 ncc';rc  Cr accont'tf ir;  dcuxibinc.-
ment lcs  t3crspectives dc marchd moirtrcnt  u.ne tende"nce qr,ri peut Otrc
cx'br6mcmcnt rmportantc pour Itavcnrr  d.e Iti.nciusti'ic  cu::op6enne: b, sa"voir
la  croissaircc de la  part  d.u tnarchiS cui'on<icn
c-d cncor\l lrhrs .L;r croj-ssa:rcc dc la  part  du
rnarchd  c1u rcstc  du:noncte, face i. ui::iegrcssiou  rl-c -1-a nart  c1u rnarch6 am5--
rica,n.  Lorsquton consicibre leorclr'c ''l.c grand-c!1r en valcur du inarch6 mc:e-"
d.iai tc}  quIiJ- est pr6r,rr oou:r l..a procha-i.nc  d-6c.;imic, cc'c-be 6volution ouvre
clcs pcrsrec-Livcs d.c rnarchi .pc'rrncttirlt  c1c pro3rammer  ..r-;r ,l6vcloppetncnt-10-
s:,tisf".isa:,t-t, Ce clj secrcur;  urorsidnernent f a structu-re d,e 1r indurstrie nondiale
i-ncitc aussi ), un;ffor'b  ilajcur  pour iiraintenir en activit6  une industrie  europ6en-
n,; forto"  l€la  sur Ie rnarcird d,es rvions civil-s,  iI  nc reste plus arrx  i-i;ats-Unis
que trors  g;.:.,ncis prod-uctc"rlrs  ,-)ii unc seulc soci5t6,  lceing,  occupe l2'), du ili-rcL6
ilonili:rl dcs longs courricr3  ::N iy),9; cle cel-r-'i des courts-ino]ens coumillrs'  'trn outrer
les pressrons vers de nouvelles conccntrati-ons cle;ieurent fortes  dans lrindustri-e
+leric:,inc.  La. neil,ler-L1c 8.1.r,lrlLie pour 1r:s utilisateurs  curolr'jens oc pouvoi-r
achet.r  D, ir.:,venir d.ans C3s concl-itions  dc concurlnilce  sera 1t':xi-stencc  drun'';
industril  curo,r6ennc via,:le  c:lpable de c15v':lop1rer dcs coop6retions 'l'vec cirauires
inri*s irics,  te11es que celles  rl'Lr. Japon ci; d".:s .itats-Unis sur i-rne ba.sJ qu1 ni  s(-rr.'[ i)as
celle  de I'r  ddpendance'a,
-lr-
Un progrannme  comnun pour la construction d-e grand.s avions c1e transport civil
1. Les persgq-c,tives d.u march€
Lranalyse effectu6e par la Conmi-ssion avec la coll-aboration de ltAssociaiion
Furop6enne  d-es Oonstructeurs cie Ma-i;6rie1 A.dronautique (llCtin) sur les donn6es
relatives a.u.:{ progra,mmes existan'rs ainsi que sur 1es perspectives du march6,
a abor-rti i. trois  conclusions  :
-  le nain-i;:-en de la
courrie6 d.e moins
pr6sence europ6enne d.arrs le secteur d"u. court et moyen/
d.e 100 places;
-  Itexamen d-es diverses solutioirs jrermettant i  ltind"ustri-e europ6enne droccuper
une place importante sur 1e iaarchd des autres ac-bions court et moyen/courriersl
-  Ia ndcessitd d.r6tud.es approfondies sur I'opportunit6  d.e prendre une initiative
dans le dontaine  d.es lonp courriers,
Dans }e *?Isl!r3r_cas iI  sragit essentiellement d.u suppor-L i  d.onner aux progra.rufleii
existants e'c des garanties ) offrrn-pour leur  d6veloppement fufu-r, afin d"e
naintenir et m6me 6largir Irimplantation sur le marche rnond.ial, qui est d.$j},
avna'l'lan*o /'otamment  avec les avion F 27r F 23 ei ll3 743), ilais qui peut 6-Lr,:
menac6e par.r d-es nouveaux projets an6ricains.
Dans I,e deu:ribme cas Bar con-bre, cles choix diffioiles  se irrelsentent dans un 1)!iui fL,
aveni-r" LrEurope d-evra d.rabord. d-ecid.er comment occuper 1e marchd qui sf annonct
^^,,-  1^^  ^..-: ^ uour'res avlons bj.rnoteurs d.rune capacit6 autour cle l,lo/t5Lr places" fI  stagir.
d.ravions munis d-e nouveaux  moteurs ayant d.es perfonnDi:ices nettement arn6liorc;c,l
en consoml'rsJion d.e carburant et niveau sonore. Lrrnd-ustrie eu"rop6enne se pr6s;, i,,,,
avec I projets de d6veloppement d-ravions existantr, (iiercure, ;AC 111 et irj-cLc.-i.,,,
fl  faudra en outre trouver unc solution europ6enne r'.r problbile ouvert par J,a
coop6ra'r,ion italienne avec Boeing sLLr ]e prograrruile 7 x 7 (avion trimoteur  drgnrrj16111
200 places;), compte tenu de la concurrence  qurun-bct progralnme pourrait fairc
i, un autre programtne europ6en, 1r.lirbus, d-ans sa versioir B 10 Ce capaoit6 rt5d"uiie,
qui est envisag6..
Enfin il  faud.ra que ltEurope met'be tout en oeuvre afin que lrerp6rience il,j-rbus,
Ia plus irnportante parmi 1es coolr,5rations  tent6es jusq,.r?ici, regoive tout Ie
support n6cessaire d. son succbs d6fj-nitif.
Dans ie "brgrqiQme_ggq, Concorde cLerneure le seul prograrnne existant et ses per-
^-^a*i"^^ ^^'"t d1ffi-ciles i. d6finir  avant son entr6c effective en serrrice" Les DPSV  VT  V VD  DU1I
d.6cisions i  prendre d.ans ce d-oinai-ne d-es longs courrj-ers, semblent donr porter
sur le lanccment d.tun nouveau prog-carlne, quadrimo'beur clc capacit6 de 200 places,
nrri n^l'n?a ^-end-re la  successi-on des 707 et DC B. fci  errcore Airbus semble pouvoir r  G  yf  !
fournir la ba"se d.r6tud.e Ia nlus in-b6ressante aver sa version B 11.
2. Les_*or:Llcipcs devant inspirer ic  pLogramme commun
Cet ensenble  d.e problbmes et d.e choix )  effectuer d.cvront 0tre affront6s selon
les principes suivants  :
-  la toiali-b6 d.es activit6s ind,ustriell-es  d"a:rs cc domainc, y compris cellcs
faits. cn coop6ration  avcc ltind-ugtrie dcspays ticrs,  doit Gtre ins6rdedans  .,-.
cadre coh6rent d.tun progamme global;
-  la r6partition des travaux doi'o O-bre r,6ali-sde d-e Ia fagon la plus 6qui.librr',-,
-^^^; 





cettc r6partitio4 d-oii Gtre effectudq, en outre, cn bcirant conpte de lf6chclonn'-
rnent da:rs le temps de la r6alisa-bion  du prograrnme colD;:cun afin d-rassurer il chaquc
partenairc.-rn plan de charge 6qr-iilibr6 po,:r lrcnsemble c1c Ia p6riod"e en causei
les cons6cuences  d.e la r6alieaL;icn d-run programme cottliurltl pour les avions de
transport civil  seraient extrbmencnt irnportantes pour le sous-secteur  des
propulscurs car lr6largi-ssenent cie ses d.6bouch6s lui  pcrile'ttra de mieux assurcr
son i-nd6pencia,nce  technologique qi-Li pouruait 6tre misc cl1 causo par unc trop
fortr.  fl6n.n:lsnr:6 \  'l r:fr4.at rrn I I i_nd-r,-strie des lltaits-Upis.  ih  cffet  Ie  sort M  UV  UWF'Ull4@llVg  a  U  gSOIU  UV  r  l:lULlp  Ul  !V  UVD  rr  vc
des sous-scc-Lcurs 'ucellules'r et "propulseurs'o est ilutucllement  1i6 d.e fagon
si 6troite que lrun ne peut sr-rrvivre sans lrautre;
les cons6c_ucnc;cs  cirun tcI  prograiilrilc au nivcau d.u sous-scc-beur ur6quipcments'i
d-evront Otr.c consid.6r6es  afin de lrroinouvoir 1es coop6ra,:;ions  appropri-6es on vuc
d-e ler rdalisation  clc certains systbines et sous-enseinblcs  clestinds aux avions
n*  mn*orrlc  rirr  ,rr-no?nn1mo  anmmlrn' *.-  ji *Jgrarnme  commLln,
conpie 'tenrl c1c ltimbricaLion indLustriellc  entre acbivib6s civi-l-c et militairet
It6quilibre recheroh6 ci-d,essus sera consid6rablerrrcnt facilit6,  si des progrbs
parallbles  son-b atteints dans 1e d-oraaine de 1a cons-i;rr-rction a,6ronautique nilitairc"